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INTRODUCTION

On September 28, 2009, more than 150 Guineans were massacred
during a demonstration in a stadium in Conakry, Guinea.' Tens of
thousands of people had gathered in the stadium to protest against the
government when security forces entered the stadium and opened fire. 2
During the events, members of the Guinean security forces also brutally
3
raped numerous women.
In response to the violence, the U.N. Secretary-General established a
Commission of Inquiry to investigate the gross human rights
violations.4 This Commission was mandated to "qualify the crime
perpetrated," to "determine responsibilities," and to "identify those
responsible."5 The Commission's report listed the names of government
and militia officials, and other individuals susRected of bearing
individual criminal responsibility for the atrocities. The Commission

1.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BLOODY MONDAY: THE SEPTEMBER 28 MASSACRES AND

RAPES BY SECURITY FORCES INGUINEA 4 (2009), availableat http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/

12/16/bloody-monday-0.
2. Id. at 4,6.
3. Id. at 7-8.
4. U.N. Security Council, Report of the InternationalCommission of Inquiry Mandated
to Establish the Factsand Circumstancesof the Events of28 September 2009 in Guinea, 1, U.N.
Doc. S/2009/693 (Dec. 18, 2009), available at http://www.unher.org/refworld/docid/
4b4f49ea2.html [hereinafter Guinea Report].
5. Id. 1.
6. Id. 215,253.
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concluded that there was "prima facie evidence" 7 or, in other cases,
"sufficient grounds"8 to assume that the people listed in the report were
criminally responsible.9 In its recommendations, the Commission called
upon the Security Council to refer the cases of these individual suspects
to the International Criminal Court (ICC).10
The human rights violations investigated by U.N. missions often are
so atrocious that they amount to international crimes, such as genocide
and crimes against humanity. From the early use of human rights factfinding by the United Nations, these missions have been authorized to
establish the types of crimes committed, and even to draw conclusions
on the accountability or responsibility for such crimes.II
In the first few decades of human rights fact-finding, U.N. responses
to such conclusions were in most cases of a political nature, as a means
to put pressure on governments.12 From the 1990s, these conclusions on
criminal responsibility in fact-finding reqorts increasingly led to
responses of a criminal prosecutorial nature.
For example, investigations into human rights violations formed the
basis for the establishment of international criminal tribunals, such as
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 14 With the
creation of the ICC, the U.N. Security Council was granted the authority
to refer cases to the Office of the Prosecutor of the Court." Such
referrals could (and can) be based on the conclusions of a fact-finding
7. Id. J 216, 229.
8. Id. 236.
9. Id. J 216, 229, 236.
10. Id. 275. In May 2010, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
established an office in Conakry as a follow-up to the Commission's recommendations. See
Press Release, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Human Rights Chief
Navi Pillay to Visit Guinea and Senegal, 13-18 Mar. (Mar. 11, 2011), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=10837&LanglD=E
(last visited Sept. 6, 2011). It follows from U.N. High Commissioner Navi Pillay's statement in
Conakry on March 15, 2011 that, although relative security had returned to Guinea and
presidential elections were held without incident, no justice mechanisms had been put in place
either nationally or internationally to deal with the question of culpability and reparation for the
alleged crimes committed. See Press Release, Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Statement by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Press in Guinea
(Mar. 15, 2011), available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?
NewsID=10852&LangID=E (last visited Sept 30, 2011).
11. See generally BERTRAND G. RAMCHARAN, THE PROTECTION ROLES OF U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS SPECIAL PROCEDURES 125-31 (2009).

12. See id at 131-32; infra text accompanying notes 36 & 121-22; infra Part I.C.1.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 91-92.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 36 & 121-22; infra Part I.C.1.
15. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 13(b), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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report.16 In addition, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC has based
some of its decisions to start investigations (partly) on fact-finding
reports.' 7
The increased use of U.N. fact-finding for criminal prosecutorial
purposes, and the practice of drawing conclusions on criminal
responsibility in fact-finding reports, have so far caused little study and
debate. This is surprising, given the possible far-reaching political
implications and potentially severe consequences of individual criminal
prosecutions.
In almost fifty years of U.N. human rights fact-finding practice, only
a few authors have directly or indirectly addressed this issue. For
example, M. Cherif Bassiouni argues that the function of fact-finding is
to establish accountability. He writes:
Fact-finding and investigation are a means to an end. With
respect to the values of truth and justice, the end is accountability
of the perpetrators, particularly the leaders of jus cogens crimes
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture,
slavery and slave-related practices, and apartheid. But
accountability has yet to be clearly established as one of the goals
of fact-finding missions.
It is, however, not explicitly clear whether Bassiouni understands
accountability within this context to mean individual criminal
responsibility, political accountability or both. 19 Given that he calls for
accountability of perpetrators in the context of "truth and justice," I
assume the emphasis is on individual criminal responsibility.2
In a discussion of the Goldstone report, which investigated the
military actions of the Israel Defense Forces in Gaza in 2009,2 ' GeertJan Knoops warns against conclusions by U.N. fact-finders on criminal
culpability. 22 Knoops argues that the members of U.N. fact-finding
16.

See infra text accompanying notes 36 & 121-22; infra Part I.C..

17.

See infra text accompanying notes 103-04.

18. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Appraising U.N Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions, 5
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 35, 45 (2001).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. The fact-finding mission led by Justice Richard Goldstone was mandated "to
investigate all violations of intemational human rights law and international humanitarian law
that might have been committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were
conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, whether
before, during or after." U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Human Rights in
Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 151, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009).
22.

GEERT-JAN KNoops, BLUFPOKER: DE DUISTERE WERELD VAN HET INTERNATIONAAL
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commissions are not judges, and that they therefore should refrain from
voicing legal judgments on the criminal responsibility. 23 Rather, such
committee members should focus on establishing the facts without
evaluating them. 24 Knoops believes that conclusions regarding the
criminal responsibility could even be dangerous and have a polarizing
effect between the parties in dispute. 25
Lyal S. Sunga, in contrast, pleads for closer cooperation between
fact-finding by the United Nations and fact-finding for the purposes of
international criminal prosecutions. 26 He reasons that, given the lack of
resources of the ICC, it is necessary to look for additional sources.27
According to Sunga, U.N. human rights fact-finding "can . . . help the

ICC: understand the general background or situation; place discrete
events or incidents such as massacres into wider perspective; and, in
some cases, identify cases ripe for prosecution." 28
The purpose of this Article is to start a debate on whether human
rights fact-finding conducted under the auspices of the United Nations
should be used to establish individual criminal responsibility, and
whether the information obtained through such missions should be used
in international criminal prosecutions. Throughout this Article, I look
into the goals, functions, and mandates of human rights fact-finding,
and the working methods used in fact-finding missions. My analysis
includes a comparison of the methods applied in human rights factfinding and the procedural rules of international criminal law. Using
three cases-the missions to Rwanda, Darfur, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC)-I show that there are no procedural and
methodological standardized rules on how to conduct human rights factfinding. As a result, each mission applies its own standards for
establishing criminal responsibility.
On the basis of this research, I raise questions about the current and
future practice of fact-finding by the United Nations. For example, I ask
whether human rights fact-finding missions should at all be authorized
"to establish individual criminal responsibility" and, if so, what that
authorization does or should entail. Another pertinent question I raise is
whether fact-finding should be aimed at or the information used in
(possible) future criminal prosecutions, as Sunga argues. I conclude by
RECHT [BLUFF POKER: THE DARK WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 94-95 (2011).

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 95.
Id.
Id.
See Lyal S. Sunga, How Can U.N. Human Rights Special Procedures Sharpen ICC
Fact-Finding?,15 INT'L J. HuM. RTs. 187, 188 (2011).
27. Id. at 188.
28. Id. While Sunga addresses the relationship between fact-finding and international
criminal trials, he limits his discussion to international criminal trial and does not get into detail
in the merits of human rights fact-finding by the United Nations. See id. at 187-202.
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suggesting several legal, political and practical considerations that ought
to be taken into account when answering these questions. In doing so, I
argue that at the very least, the methods used in fact-finding need to be
revised and standardized in order for fact-finding reports to represent a
verifiable and uniform source for decision makers.
I. UNDERSTANDING U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING

A. Introduction
Prior to the foundation of the United Nations, fact-finding was
employed only to help settle disputes of an international nature. The
first fact-finding exercises can be traced back to the 1899 and 1907
Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes. 30 By the time the League of Nations was founded, the
instrument of fact-finding had become an institutionalized mechanism
entrenched in the international system. Over the years, states gradually
gave up pieces of sovereign power to the benefit of international
institutions by relinquishing the power not only "to settle facts disputed
by two states, but also to provide a basis for collective action by
international bodies." 32 These efforts paved the way for further
development of the instrument of fact-finding within the U.N.
framework.
The United Nations expanded the use of fact-finding from the
settlement of international disputes to investigations within state borders
in cases involving human rights violations. Such violations are often
committed by a government against its citizens or by non-state actors
domestically, while the government is unable or unwilling to act. Some
states have argued that human rights issues fall within their domestic
sovereignty and that Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter prevents the
United Nations from intervening in the domestic sphere on these
issues. Several scholars, in contrast, have expressed their belief that,
29. For more information about the development in the utilization of fact-finding for the
settlement of international disputes, prior to the establishment of the United Nations, see
Thomas M. Franck & Laurence D. Cherkis, The Problem of Fact-Finding in International
Disputes, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 1483, 1483-524 (1966-67); see also WILLIAM SHORE, FACTFINDING IN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE 1-49 (1970).

30. See Permanent Court of Arbitration, Founding Conventions, http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1037 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
31. See generally Franck & Cherkis, supra note 29; SHORE, supranote 29.
32. David Weissbrodt & James McCarthy, Fact-Finding by International
Nongovernmental Human Rights Organizations,22 VA. J. INT'LL. 1, 20 (1981).
33. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
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with the adoption of the U.N. Charter, human rights became no longer
solely a domestic matter but an issue of international concern. 34 In any
event, over the years, most states have accepted the intervention of the
United Nations by way of human rights fact-finding.
From the earliest fact-finding missions, the mandate-holders
investigated state responsibility, as well as individual and corporate
responsibility for human rights violations. 35 With some exceptions,
international responses to such conclusions were primarily of a political
nature, such as raising sanction and condemning government
activities. 36 The last two decades have shown an increase in and an
institutionalization of the international criminal prosecution of
individuals as a response to the conclusions in fact-finding reports. 37 To
lay the background to this development, I examine below the legal basis
and different forms of fact-finding missions.
B. The Legal Basisfor Fact-Finding
Two of the main purposes of the United Nations are "[t]o maintain
international peace and security" and "[tlo develop friendly relations
among nations." 39 Different U.N. organs have been given the (implied)
authority to create fact-finding missions, based on tasks related to the
fulfillment of the goal of maintaining international peace and security.
For instance, Article 34 of the U.N. Charter authorizes the Security
Council to "investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to
international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine
whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security." 40 To fulfill its
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VIl."). See also Robert Miller, U.N. Fact-Finding Missions in the Field of Human
Rights, AusT. Y.B. INT'L L. 40, 40-41 (1970-73) (noting, however, that missions have marked a
"significant development" in human rights).
34. See Stephen Kaufman, The Necessity for Rules of Procedure in Ad Hoc U.N.
Investigations, 18 AM. U.L. REv. 739, 748-50 (1969) (referring to Professor Cassin, Sir Hirsch
Lauterpacht, and Professor Brunet).
35. RAMCHARAN, supra note 11, at 125.
36. In Part IV.C., I discuss how decisions on criminal prosecution, or in any case, referral
by the Security Council, are in fact often political. However, I use the word "political" to
distinguish between criminal prosecutorial consequences and other responses, such as sanctions.
37. See Part II.C.
38. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
39. Id. art. 1, para. 2.
40. Id. art. 34. The words "any situation" are a clear indication that fact-finding under the
U.N. auspices is no longer merely a mechanism for dispute settlement between states, but that it
has also become an instrument that can be used in situations where the tension arises within a
state. Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 32, at 21.
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investigatory function the Security Council "may [also] establish . . .
subsidiary organs." 41
In addition, the General Assembly "may discuss any questions
relating to the maintenance of international peace," 42 and is further
authorized to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any
situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the
general welfare or friendly relations among nations."4 3 Like the Security
Council, "[t]he General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs
as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions." 44
Finally, "[t]he Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the
Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security." 4 5 On December 9,
1991, the General Assembly adopted the Declarationon Fact-Finding
by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International
Peace and Security.46
In Section IV, the Declaration states:
The Secretary-General should monitor the state of international
peace and security regularly and systematically in order to
provide early warning of disputes or situations which might
threaten international peace and security. To this end, the
Secretary-General should make full use of the informationgathering capabilities of the Secretariat and keep under review
the improvement of these capabilities.4 7
With this Declaration, the Secretary-General has been given "an
explicit and wide-ranging mandate to monitor situations as close as he
sees fit."4 8
As part of the aim to have "peaceful and friendly relations among
nations," Article 55 of the U.N. Charter stipulates that, as a whole, "the
41.

U.N. Charter art. 29.

42.

Id. art. 11, para. 2.

43. Id. art. 14.
44. Id. art. 22. Such functions include those described in Articles 11 and 14.
45. Id. art. 99. Accord SHORE, supra note 29, at 95; Franck & Cherkis, supra note 29, at
1496 n.98.
46. Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of Maintenance of
International Peace and Security, G.A. Res. 46/59, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/59 (Dec. 9, 1991)
[hereinafter Declaration on Fact-finding], available at http://www.un.org/Docs/asp/ws.asp?m=
A/RES/46/59. See also supra Part II.B.
47. Declaration on Fact-finding, supra note 46, Special Procedures § 4.
48. A. Walter Dorn, Keeping Watch for Peace: Fact-Finding by the United Nations
Secretary-General, in E. FAWCETT & H. NEWCOMBE, UNITED NATIONS REFORM: LOOING
available at
AHEAD AFTER FIFTY YEARS, SCIENCE FOR PEACE 138-54 (1995),

http://walterdorn.org/pub/39 (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
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United Nations shall promote: . . . universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all . . ."'4 Although

Article 55 is directed at all the U.N. organs, it is the General Assembly
that has been given explicit powers to "initiate studies and make
recommendations" for the "realization of human rights and fundamental
freedoms."50 In addition, the General Assembly has the responsibility to
ensure the promotion of human rights, which it can delegate to the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 5 1 This responsibility and
delegation of powers does not, however, exclude the other organs from
promoting respect for human rights by means such as fact-finding.
In its turn, the ECOSOC has been given the authority to conduct
fact-finding in the context of human rights. The ECOSOC is authorized
to "make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all" 5
and is required to "set up commissions in economic and social fields
and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as
may be required for the performance of its functions."53 In the exercise
of its task, the ECOSOC established the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was composed of fifty-three Member States and
designed to deal with "the whole range of human rights problems." 54 To
carry out this task, it was allowed to create working groups or appoint
individual experts on an ad hoc basis.5 5
From the 1980s, the Commission on Human Rights also started to
develop more permanent mechanisms of inquiry, named Special
Procedures.56 These Special Procedures are either executed by an
individual or a working group dealing with human rights issues that
either arise in a specific country ("country mandates"), or that relate to

49. U.N. Charter art. 55.
50. Id art. 13, para. 1.
51. Id art. 60.
52. Id. art. 62, para. 2.
53. Id. art. 68.
54. G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Apr. 3, 2006). There has been a debate
on whether the authority of the Commission on Human Rights derived from the ECOSOC, or
from the ECOSOC and the General Assembly. See Kaufman, supra note 34, at 745; Miller,
supra note 33, at 44.
55. Kaufman, supra note 34, at 745 n.32.
56. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Procedures of the
Human Rights Council, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx (last
visited June 23, 2012) [hereinafter Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. See also
Philip Alston, Hobbling the Monitors: Should U.N. Human Rights Monitors be Accountable?,
52 HARv. INT'L L.J. 561, 569 (2011). The Commission started working with special procedures
to address the concerns expressed by several countries, including the former Eastern bloc and
military regimes in Argentina and Chile, that the United Nations would be conducting
investigations in the domestic sphere. See RAMCHARAN, supra note 11, at 1-2, 55-56.
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human rights themes of a specific concern ("thematic mandates"). 57
When the Human Rights Council replaced the Commission on Human
Rights in 2006,8 it assumed the mandates of the Special Procedures
established by the Commission on Human Rights, 59 and still today "it
continues to work closely with the Special Procedures."60 In the late
1970s, the Commission on Human Rights decided, for logistical
reasons, to start working with a single Special Rapporteur in Special
Procedures, rather than with a working group of three to five experts.61
Even at present, most Special Procedures mandate-holders are
individual Special Rapporteurs.62 They are independent experts who
work for the United Nations on a voluntary basis and in an independent
capacity.63 The resolutions that establish the mandates also define what
the mission will entail. 64 The functions carried out by the Special
Procedures have expanded over the years, but the core duties include
situational analysis, fact-finding and reporting, taking urgent action, and
providing advice to governments and the Commission on Human
Rights, now the Human Rights Council. 65
C. Development of the Practiceof U.N. Human Rights Fact-Finding:
From Politicalto CriminalAccountability
1. Introduction
From the earliest human rights fact-finding missions in the 1960s,
mandate-holders have been given the authority to investigate and
57. .Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, supra note 56. Currently, there are
twelve country mandates: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Country
Mandates, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Countries.aspx (last updated July 6,
2012); and thirty-six thematic mandates, such as the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention:
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Thematic Mandates, http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/HR Bodies/SP/Pages/Themes.aspx (last updated July 6, 2012).
58. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Background Information
on the Human Rights Council, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/About
Council.aspx (last visited June 23, 2012).
59. Id.
60. United Nations, Global Issues: Human Rights, http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/
humanrights/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2012).
61. RAMCHARAN, supra note 11, at 52.
62. See Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, supra note 56, Introduction.
There are five thematic working groups and no working groups with a country mandate; the
mandate-holders for a country mandate are all Special Rapporteurs. Id.
63. RAMCHARAN, supra note 11, at vii. See also Special Procedures of the Human Rights
Council,supra note 56.
64. Special Proceduresof the Human Rights Council,supra note 56.
65.

RAMCHARAN, supra note 11, at 1, 3.
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evaluate individual responsibility for committing human rights
violations that might reach the level of international crimes. The
Working Group of Experts to Southern Africa, established by the
66
Commission on Human Rights in 1967, was given the task to inquire
whether certain persons were "guilty of the crime of apartheid or of a
serious violation of human rights, in accordance with article II of the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid."6 7 Consequently, the General Assembly "invited
the Commission on Human Rights to compile periodically a progressive
list of individuals, organizations, institutions and representatives of
States deemed responsible for crimes enumerated in Article II of the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid ... 68 The General Assembly then requested the
Secretary-General to publish and distribute that list in order to make
known to the public who was considered guilty of the crime of
apartheid.69 As a result of its publication, the list transformed a political
instrument, putting pressure on the apartheid government of South
Africa by way of naming and shaming, rather than merely indicating the
criminal responsibility of certain individuals.
With the establishment of various international and mixed criminal
tribunals in the 1990s, the criminal implications of human rights factfinding have augmented significantly. For example, prior to the
establishment of the ICTY, U.N. fact-finding missions conducted
extensive investigations. Reports from the Special Rapporteur on the
Former Yugoslavia and pressure from the international community led
the Security Council to request that the Secretary-General create a
Commission of Experts to investigate the breaches of international
humanitarian law. 7 1
66. ECOSOC Res. 1235 (XLII), U.N. Doc. E/4393 (XLII) (1967).
67. Id. at 130. It was not until 1973, six years after establishment ofthe mission, that the
crime of apartheid was declared a crime against humanity. International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3068 (XXVIII), art. I (Nov. 30, 1973). The working group was given the mandate to
investigate the crime of apartheid in 1977. RAMCHARAN, supra note 11, at 130.
68.

RAMCHARAN, supra note 11, at 131.

69.
70.

Id. at 131-32.
Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 46. On previous occasions, commissions of inquiry had

also preceded war tribunals. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT (3d ed., 2008) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW]. For

example, the 1919 Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on
Enforcement of Penalties (for war crimes during WWI), the 1943 U.N. War Crime Commission
(that investigated German war crimes during World War II and that was followed by Nuremberg
Tribunal), and the 1946 Far Eastern Commission (for the investigation of Japanese war crimes
during World War II). INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra,at 3.
71. Sunga, supra note 26, at 191-92. See also S.C. Res. 780, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (Oct.
6, 1992).
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The resulting document consisted of eighteen months of
investigation by that Commission and was later handed to the
Prosecutor of the ICTY.7 2 Although "most of the information gathered
or received by the Commission of Experts could not be used directly as
evidence in prosecutions[, it was] useful more to help establish the
location, character and scale of violations."n Bassiouni, chairman of the
Commission, stressed that "if it had not been for the work of the
Commission, the ICTY Prosecutor ... would not have been able to start
his work as fast and as efficiently." 74
The interplay between human rights fact-finding and international
criminal prosecution has intensified even more as a result of the creation
of the ICC. The Rome Statute, which created the ICC, not only
authorizes the Prosecutor to "seek additional information from . . .
organs of the United Nations[,]"7 5 but also authorizes the Security
Council to refer cases to the ICC.76 Below, through the use of three
cases in which U.N. fact-finding missions had criminal implications, I
further exemplify the ways in which this interplay takes place. These
cases are the missions to Rwanda, Darfur, and to the DRC.
2. Rwanda 1994
In May 1994, in response to the genocide in Rwanda, the
Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur to
conduct an investigation into the human rights situation there. 77 The
mandate of the Special Rapporteur included "report[ing] ...

on the

situation of human rights in Rwanda, including the root causes and
responsibilities," and "mak[ing] available . . . systematically compiled

information on possible violations of human rights and of international
humanitarian law."78
The mandate further described that these two elements of the
mandate should be understood as entailing two complementary stages:
in the first stage, more general information would be collected, which
could serve to clarify information of the second stage, which was

72. Sunga, supra note 26, at 192.
73. Id. at 193.
74. Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 47.
75. Rome Statute, supranote 15, art. 15(2).
76. Id. art. 13(b).
77. See Comm'n on Human Rights, infra note 78, 1 1.
78. Commission on Human Rights, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and
8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (28 June 1995)
Other Dependent Countries and Territories,
[hereinafter Comm'n on Human Rights], available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
commission/country51/7.htm.
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collected through more in-depth investigation into specific cases.7 9 This
two-stage process was illustrated by the following example: information
on the organization of the military might be necessary to provide
general information on the situation with a view to finding adequate
responses, as well as to establish individual responsibility through
command responsibility.80 To make sure that the information collected
at each stage would be complementary, the mandate instructed that
information be "collected, recorded and analyzed in a way such that it
[would] be usable in the event of a trial by a national or, if appropriate,
international court."'
In his evaluation of the facts, the Special Rapporteur concluded that
the events that occurred in Rwanda met the elements of the crime of
genocide of the Tutsi population. 82 In addition, he established that
assassinations of Hutus and other violations had occurred.8 3 The
Rapporteur drew up a list of individuals who were "involved in the
planning and execution of the atrocities."84 However, he explained that
he would need more time "to establish the chain of responsibility and
draw up a list of the perpetrators as they are identified." In the report,
the Rapporteur did, however, immediately name organs and authorities
that bore responsibility for the atrocities.
Following the report of the Special Rapporteur (and with a view to
the establishment of a criminal tribunal for Rwanda, although the
resolution did not explicitly state this goal), the Security Council
decided to establish another mission, the Commission of Experts.8 8 The

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. 19-10.
Id.
Id.111.
Id. f 45-46.
Id. %49-50.
Id. 62.
Id.
Id. 63.
See Sunga, supra note 26, at 193.
At the very least, the UN had to do its utmost to prosecute the perpetrators and
assist Rwanda to re-establish the rule of law and promote conditions that would
enable recovery from the catastrophe. Politically therefore, the Security
Council had little choice but to establish the Commission of Experts on
Rwanda.

Id. at 194. But see Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 42-43 (claiming that that the Commission of
Experts was nothing more than a procedural step the Security Council felt it had to take, before
it could establish the ICTR, as was done with the ICTY, and as a way to buy time to work out
the logistical aspects of establishing a new tribunal).
88. S.C. Res. 935, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (July 1, 1994).
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Commission was to "review and update information." 89 Based on that
information, the Commission was instructed to "draw its own
conclusions" and "to determine whether and to what extent certain
individuals might be held responsible for having committed those
violations." 90 In its report, the Commission, like the Special Rapporteur,
concluded that acts of genocide had been committed against Tutsis, but
as for individual criminal responsibility, it did not go much further than
stating that individuals from both sides had committed crimes against
humanity.91 The Security Council based its decision to establish the
ICTR on the information supplied by these reports. 92
3. Darfur 2004
In 2004 the Security Council established the Commission of Inquiry
for Darfur. 3 This decision was sparked by the fact that hardly anything
had been done b the Sudanese government to end the humanitarian
crisis in Darfur. In fact, the parties to the conflict, including the
government, had recently violated the existing ceasefire agreement. 95
The purpose of the Commission of Inquiry was "to investigate reports
of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in
Darfur[,] . . . to determine also whether or not acts of genocide [had]

occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view
to ensuring those responsible are held accountable." 96
The five-member commission investigated events that had taken
place between February 2003 and mid-January 2005.97 The Commission
concluded that no acts of genocide had been committed because it could
89. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated I Oct. 1994 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, 3, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (Oct. 4, 1994)
[hereinafter Letterfrom the Secretary-General].
90. Id.
91. Id. 1 146-48.
92. S.C. Res. 955, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). The Special Rapporteur
went on a second mission resulting in a report, which contributed to the decision to establish the
ICTY; however, the report does not deal with the actual genocide but with its aftermath. See
Commission on Human Rights, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms in Any Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent
Countries and Territories, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/12 (Aug. 12, 1994), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol%29/E.CN.4.1995.12.En?Opendocu
ment.
93. S.C. Res. 1564, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004).
94. Id. T 2.
95. Id. T 1.
96. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated 31 Jan. 2005 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Feb. 1, 2005)
[hereinafter DarfurReport].
97. Id. T 2, 3.
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not be established that the government had "a specific intent to
annihilate, in whole or in part a group distinguished on racial, ethnic,
national or religious grounds." However, the Commission did find that
crimes against humanity had been committed. 99
Based on the evidence collected the Commission drew up a nonexhaustive list of possible suspects, o'which remained confidential and
was "placed in the custody of the U.N. Secretary-General." 0 1
The Commission emphasized that by drawing up the list it did not
establish guilt; it had intended only to "pave the way for future
investigations and possible indictments by a prosecutor, and convictions
by a court of law." 02 Those future investigations became reality when
the Security Council referred the case of Darfur to the Office of the
Prosecutor of the ICC, which opened the investigation.' 0 3 After the
referral, the documentation gathered by the Commission of Inquiry to
Darfur was sent to the Prosecution's Office and formed part of the
materials the prosecutor used as the basis for his decision to open an
investigation. 4 Currently, there are five cases, concerning the situation
in Darfur, pending before the Court.' 0 5
4. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 2010
Following the discovery by the peacekeeping operation in the DRC
of a mass grave in 2005, the U.N. Secretary-General decided to approve
a Mapping Exercise to the DRC.' 0 6 The Mapping Exercise was an
unprecedented form of fact-finding, established by the Secretary98. Id. 518.
99. See id. 519.
100. Id. TT 644, 646.
101. Id 645.
102. Id. 643.
103. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Int'l Criminal Court, The Prosecutor of the
ICC Opens Investigation in Darfur (June 6, 2005), available at http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2005/the%20prosecutor%2OoP/2Ot
he%20icc%20opens%20investigation%20in%20darfur.
104. Id.
105.

Situations

and

Cases,

INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

COURT,

http://www.icc-

cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/(last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
106. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations
of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed Within the Territory of the
1-2, unofficial
Democratic Republic of the Congo Between March 1993 and June 2003,
translation from French original, (Aug. 2010), http://www.ohchr.org/en/Countries/Africa
Region/Pages/RDCProjetMapping.aspx [hereinafter DRC Report]. See also Office of the High
Commissioner of Human Rights, DRC: Mapping Human Rights Violations 1993-2003, UNITED
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/en/Countries/AfricaRegion/Pages/RDCProjet
Mapping.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
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General through the approval of the Terms of Reference, rather than by
means of a resolution providing a mandate.' 07 The discoveries resulting
from the Mapping Exercise were compiled in a report by the Office of
the High Commissioner of Human Rights in August 2010.1os
The report held that the purpose of the Mapping Exercise was:
[T]o gather, analyse, and publish primafacie evidence of human
rights and international humanitarian law violations and, on the
basis of the findings of the exercise, to carry out an assessment of
the existing capacities within the national justice system in the
DRC to address such violations as might be uncovered.109
Further, the Exercise "[did] not seek to gather evidence that would
be admissible in court, but to 'provide the basis for the formulation of
initial hypotheses of investigation by giving a sense of the scale of the
violations, detecting patterns and identifying potential leads or sources
of evidence."' 110
The report further explained that it was not the mission's intention
"to establish or to try to establish individual criminal responsibility of
given actors.""' 1 However, the report did include the names of
perpetrators who were already subject to an arrest warrant or who had
already been convicted of the crimes concerned.1 12 Additionally, the
mission drew up a confidential list with the names of "alleged
perpetrators," which was stored in the database of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights.1 3 Finally, the report also included the
names of groups that should be held accountable for crimes
committed." The Commission explained it felt compelled to include
such information in order to be able "to classify these serious violations
of international humanitarian law."' 15
Among the accused in the DRC Report was the government of
neighboring country Rwanda. Facing allegations of committing war
crimes and possibly genocide against Hutu in the DRC, the Government
of Rwanda reacted to the accusations by submitting a highly critical

107. DRC Report, supra note 106, f1 89-93 (summarizing and analyzing the Terms of
Reference).
108. Id.
109. Id. 87.
110.

Id.

95 (quoting OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE-OF-

LAW TOOLS FOR POST CONFLICT STATES: PROSECUTION INITIATIVES 6 (2008)).

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

103.
104.
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response to the DRC Report.116 Among other things, the Government of
Rwanda argued that the Mapping Exercise did not have a legal basis in
the U.N. framework."' 7 It also criticized the methodology of the draft
mapping report, particularly the reliability of witnesses, and it objected
to the analysis of the standard of proof criterion applied by the
mission.' 18 Although the question of the legal basis of the Mapping
Exercise could be a valid one, given that it was an unprecedented
exercise, in Part II of this Article, I focus on the questions. of
methodology and the standard of proof applied by the report.
D. Conclusion
The U.N. framework introduced the possibility of investigating
human rights violations in the domestic sphere of a member state.
Currently, all U.N. organs have the power to start an investigation into
the human rights situation of a country, with the purpose of
"maintaining the peace" or of "developing friendly relations among
nations."" 9 An individual expert, as well as a group of experts in the
form of a commission or a working group, can carry out such
investigations.
From the early days of U.N. fact-finding, the missions looked into
the responsibility of states, corporations and individuals for human
rights violations. 20 The Working Group of Experts to Southern Africa
concluded that the human rights violations committed also reached the
threshold of the crime of apartheid, and it published lists of alleged
perpetrators of the crime.12 1 Like most responses in the first decades of
U.N. fact-finding, these lists were not used for individual criminal
prosecutions.122 From the 1990s onward, the conclusions on individual
criminal responsibility in fact-finding reports were increasingly used to
hold individuals criminally responsible in international trials, and in
some cases, even formed the basis for the establishment of international
criminal tribunals.
The three African cases exemplify this use of fact-finding with a
116. Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Official
Government of Rwanda Comments on the Draft U.N. Mapping Report on the DRC 3 (2010),
http://www.gov.rw/IMG/ pdf/DRCReport CommentsRwanda.pdf [hereinafter Government of
Rwanda Report].
117. Id. at 5.
118. Id. at 3. See infra Part III.B for more on the issue of standard of proof.
119. See generally UN at a Glance, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/
index.shtml (listing two of U.N. main purposes as "keep[ing] peace throughout the world," and
"develop[ing] friendly relations among nations").
120.

RAMCHARAN, supranote 11, at 125.

121.
122.

See id.
Id. at 131-32.
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view to the eventuality of criminal prosecutions. The missions sought to
establish criminal responsibility in the following ways: first, the reports
aimed to establish that certain crimes had been committed; second, the
missions sought to identify individual perpetrators;' 23 third, the Report
by the Special Rapporteur to Rwanda and the DRC report also
identified organs, authorities, and groups that were involved in the
atrocities and crimes classified in the reports; fourth, the missions to
Rwanda and the DRC sought to identify priorities for an investigation or
to provide the basis for an initial hypothesis for investigation.
Hereinafter, I focus on the second and fourth categories: the
identification of individual perpetrators by fact-finders, and the
possibility of initiating international criminal prosecution (partly) on the
basis of U.N. fact-finding.
H1. METHODS OF HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING

A. Introduction
The differences in mandate between the three cases described in the
previous Part can be partly explained by the lack of standard rules of
procedure or a standard model for the execution of human rights factfinding. Justice Abdoulaye Dieye, who was a member of the first
working group to Chile in the 1980s, believed that "[it] was for a factfinder to choose the means and methods of inquiry he or she deemed
appropriate in each instance."' 24 This still seems to be the case today.
Neither the U.N. Charter nor the resolutions constituting fact-finding
missions give any guidance as to how the investigation could or should
be conducted. Each mission has its own mandate, describing the
mission's competence, as laid down in the U.N. Resolution that
establishes the mission. 12 5 The Terms of Reference (ToR) elaborate on
that mandate, and further specify the mission's tasks and
responsibilities.12 6 Naturally, these ToR differ according to the

123. As mentioned, although the Mapping Exercise to the DRC claimed it intended to
avoid establishing individual responsibility, it did list the names of both individuals already
subject to an arrest warrant or already convicted, and of alleged perpetrators. DRC Report, supra
note 106, 104.
124.

RAMCHARAN, supra note 11, at 52.

125.

Felix Ermacora, The Competence and Functions of Fact-Finding Bodies, in

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 83 (Bertrand G.

Ramcharan ed., 1982).
126. Id. The Mapping Exercise to the DRC formed an exception, in the sense that the
mission was not established by a voted upon resolution but by the Secretary-General who
approved its Terms of Reference. See supraPart I.C.4 of this Article.
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mission's goals and the mandate-holder's approach.1 27 Generally, the
ToR are very broadly formulated and therefore leave si ificant room
for the mandate-holder to interpret the terms as he sees fit.' 2 8
After the first experiences in the field of fact-finding, there were
calls to create standard procedures on the conduct of fact-finding
missions. During the 1968 International Conference of Human Rights, a
resolution was adopted that "call[ed] upon the Commission of Human
Rights to draw up model rules of procedure for the guidance of the
United Nations' bodies concerned."' 9 Since then several attempts have
been made to standardize the modus operandi of fact-finding
missions.' 3 0
B. Attempts to StandardizeFact-FindingProcedures
The first effort to standardize rules of procedure was made by the
Secretary-General in 1970, when he issued the Draft Model Rules of
Fact-Finding,qrocedure for U.N. bodies dealing with violations of
human rights. 1 The Draft Model Rules were adopted by the ECOSOC
in 1974, after the Commission on Human Rights had abbreviated the
rules and had "substantially watered them down." 32 Despite this
watering down, the Draft Model Rules retained some provisions
concerning the admissibility and gathering of evidence.' 33 Although the
Draft Model Rules have served as the basis for some missions' rules of
procedure, they never had much influence, partly because when the
ECOSOC adopted the Draft Model Rules, it merely "drew the attention
of the U.N. member states to [their] existence," but it did not
127. See Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 126, 167 (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
128. Id.
129. Kaufman, supra note 34, at 740.
130. Non-U.N. bodies and U.N. bodies in other areas than human rights have adopted
guidelines and principles that are frequently referred to and might be valuable as a reference. It
will suffice to mention the following: Thomas M. Francke, The Belgrade Minimal Rules of
Procedurefor InternationalHuman Rights Fact-FindingMissions, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 163, 16365 (1981); INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE RAOUL WALLENBERG INSTITUTE, THE
GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING VISITS AND REPORTS 1-9 (2009),

available at http://www.factfindingguidelines.org/; see U.N. Sanctions Committee Guidelines,
U.N. Security Council, Letter dated Dec. 18, 2006 from the Chairman of the Informal Working
Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/997 (Dec. 22, 2006).
131. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1021/Rev.1 (1970), in B.G. RAMCHARAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND FACT-FINDING INTHE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 239 (1982) Annex II.
132. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 1025
(Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum eds., 2006) [hereinafter LILLICH & HANNUM]; see also
Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 32, at 22-23.
133. Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 32, at 23; see infra Part III.C.
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"recommend that U.N. human rights fact-finding bodies take them into
account in their work." 34
To strengthen the role of the United Nations, in 1991 the General
Assembly established new guidelines for fact-finding by adopting the
Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the
Maintenance of International Peace and Security.135 Article I,
paragraph 2, of the Declaration defines fact-finding as "any activity
designed to obtain detailed knowledge of the relevant facts of any
dispute or situation which the competent United Nations organs need in
order to exercise effectively their functions in relation to the
maintenance of international peace and security." 36
Otherwise, the Declaration gives little guidance as to how factfinding missions should be carried out. It merely states that "[flactfinding should be comprehensive, objective, impartial, and timely."' 7 it
further holds that decisions by the United Nations to establish a factfinding mission "should always contain a clear mandate" and that the
report of the mission "should be limited to a presentation of findings of
a factual nature."' 38 As demonstrated, in reality, many reports contain
more than just the facts; they often evaluate these facts, draw
conclusions that have legal import, and give recommendations for
further action.139 Finally, paragraph 27 of the Declaration states that
"[w]henever fact-finding includes hearings, appropriate rules of
procedure should ensure their fairness." 40 However, it is not made clear
what should be considered appropriate or fair.
Even after these attempts to create standardized rules of procedure,
Philip Alston observed in 1992 that "the existing methodology for factfinding by U.N. rapporteurs is ad hoc, inconsistent, and often
unsatisfactory."'41 Several undertakings by U.N. organs tried to address
these issues. Unfortunately, however, the below discussion of the
various initiatives demonstrates that the United Nations has not
succeeded in achieving much more coherency in the methodology of
fact-finding.
A further such effort to standardize fact-finding procedures was the
adoption of the Code of Conduct for special mandate-holders by the
Human Rights Council on June 18, 2007.142 In the Code, the Council
134.

LILLICH & HANNUM, supra note 133, at 1025.

135. See Declaration on Fact-Finding, supra note 46.
136. Id.art.I, 2.
137. Id. art.I,13.
138. Id. art. II, 17.
139. This was the case in the mission reports on Rwanda, Darfur, and the DRC. See supra
Part I.C.2-4.
140. Declaration on Fact-Finding, supra note 46, art. III, T 27.
141. Alston, supra note 127, at 170.
142. H.R.C. Res. 5/2, U.N. GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/62/53, at 74
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wished to define standards of ethical behavior and professional conduct
of special mandate-holders carrying out their duty.143 Most of the
provisions in the Code of Conduct, therefore, deal with the behavior of
mandate-holders; they must "[a]ct in an independent capacit ;"44
"[e]xercise their functions in accordance with their mandate;"l 4 and
"exercise their functions on a personal basis, their responsibilities not
being national but exclusively international." 46
In relation to this conduct, Article 8 of the Code of Conduct makes
some reference to the use of sources; it provides that the confidentiality
of testimonies must be preserved;147 that the "mandate-holders shall . . .
[r]ely on objective and dependable facts based on evidentiary standards
that are appropriate to the non-judicial character of the reports;" 48 and
that states be given the opportunity to respond to the findings of the
mandate-holder.149 The Code thus emphasizes the non-judicial character
of the missions.1 50 As Nigel S. Rodley analyzes:
On the one hand, it reflects the limitations of fact-finding on the
basis of written material (normally without benefit of direct
access to the parties to an alleged violation) and does not impose
an unwarranted burden of proof on mandate-holders. On the other
hand, it is guidance to special procedures to be careful about
drawing peremptory conclusions in individual cases.15 1
In addition to the Code of Conduct, in June 2008, at the Fifteenth
Annual Meeting of special procedures, the Special Procedures mandateholders adopted the Manual o Operations of the Special Proceduresof
the Human Rights Council.'52The Manual aims to give guidance to the
(June 18, 2007).
143. Id art. 1.
144. Id art. 3(a).
145. Id. art. 3(c).
146. Id. art. 4, 1.
147. Id. art. 8(b).
148. Id. art. 8(c).
149. Id. art. 8(d).
150. Nigel S. Rodley, On the Responsibility of Special Rapporteurs, 15 INT'L J. HUM. RTs.
319, 325 (2011).
151. Id. Rodley also contends that "most special procedures do not interpret their mandates
to extend to finding violations in individual cases." Id. at 335 n.39.
152. Human Rights Council, Report on the Fifteenth Meeting of Special
Rapporteurs/Representatives,Independent Experts and Chairpersonsof Working Groups of the
Special Proceduresof the Human Rights Council, June 23-27, 2008, A/HRC/10/24 (Nov. 17,
2008),
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/annual-meetings/
15th.htm. The Manual was first adopted at the 6th Annual Meeting in 1999, but was revised at
the 15th Annual Meeting in 2008. Id. at 1. The introduction to the Manual states that "[i]t is a
living document, subject to periodic review and updating by the mandate-holders. They are
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mandate-holders and to reflect best practices. It contains a chapter on
methodology that includes some of the best practices on how to seek
and use the sources of information and on how to conduct countryvisits. 153 These best practices, however, offer very few detailed criteria
on how to gather evidence and conduct the actual research. Some of the
most detailed guidelines are that information should be cross-checked
"to the best extent possible," 54 that government representatives should
be given "[a]ppropriate opportunities . . . to comment on allegations,"' 5 5

and that "[a]t the end of a visit, mandate-holders [should] generally
organize a press conference."l 56
The mandate-holders at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting also adopted
an Internal Advisory Procedure to Review Practices and Working
Methods.' As the title suggests, this document establishes an internal
review procedure that allows any stakeholder to bring to the attention of
the Coordinating Committee situations where the mandate-holder
allegedly acted in non-alignment with the above-mentioned Manual of
Operations, where there are concerns regarding the "effectiveness or
appropriateness of methods of work," or where "integrity, independence
or impartiality" is at stake.' 58 The Internal Advisory Procedure also
notes that "the principle of self-regulation is crucial to the coherence
and viability of a system," 59 thus emphasizing that the decisions on the
methods of work are the responsibility of the mandate-holder, rather
than suggesting that these decisions should follow from standard

rules.160
Finally, in 2001, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) published a Training Manual on Human Rights
Monitoring, which is currently being revised.161 The document provides
"practical guidance principally for the conduct" of human rights officers
responsible for its content and for its revision." Id.
153. See id 123-27, 52-74.
154. Id. 23.
155. Id.124.
156. Id. 72.
157. Coordination Committee of Special Procedures, Internal Advisory Procedure to
Review Practices and Working Methods, (June 25, 2008), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/chr/special/docs/IAPWorkingMethods.pdf[hereinafter Internal Advisory Procedure].
158. Id. at 1.
159. Id.
160. Id. The next paragraph of the Internal Advisory Procedure, however, does stipulate
that it is the professional responsibility of the mandate-holders to "draw upon" standards in the
Manual of Special Procedures and Code of Conduct "as guidance in aligning" their practices
and protect human rights. Id.
161. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Training Manual for Human
Rights Monitoring, Professional Training Series Nov. 7, 2001 [hereinafter Training Manual],
available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/PublicationsResources/Pages/TrainingEducationtwo.aspx
(last visited Aug. 28, 2012)*see LILLICH & HANNUM, supra note 132, at 1017.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol24/iss2/4

22

Talsma: U.N. Human Rights Fact-Finding: Establishing Individual Criminal
2012]

U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING: ESTABLISHING INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY?

405

who carr out human rights fact-finding and monitoring under U.N.
Although the Training Manual certainly affords some
auspices.
guidance for human rights officers and trainers, its status is nothing
more than a service provided by the OHCHR.
C. Methods ofHuman Rights Fact-Findingin Practice
Most fact-finding reports give little information on the methods
applied. It is therefore difficult to establish how the missions conducted
the investigation, what methods they applied, how they dealt with
witnesses, including the protection of witnesses, and how they
approached the reliability of evidence, the corroboration of evidence or
the evaluation of that evidence.
The Rwanda reports merely describe the mandate and give limited
information on meetings and consultations with officials and some
witnesses. 163 The report on Darfur is a little more extensive, but it does
not provide much detail on how the investigation was conducted. 164 The
latter report notes that
[t]he Commission has not been endowed with the powers proper
to a prosecutor; in particular, it may not
subpoena witnesses,
or order searches or seizures, nor may it request a judge to issue
arrest warrants against suspects. It may rely only upon the
obligation of the Government of Sudan and the rebels to
cooperate. 165
Given these limitations, the Commission had to collect its "reliable
body of material" as much as possible within the boundaries of the
support of the Sudanese government.166 Some of the necessary material
the Commission collected by interviewing witnesses, government
officials, and detainees, by examining documents and by visiting places,
including mass graves.' 6 7
The Mapping Exercise by the mission to the DRC differed strikingly
from most reports because it included a section dedicated to
methodology. 6 The report explained that prior to the mission, "[a]
162. Training Manual, supra note 161, at iii. Some of these standards will be discussed in
Part III.
112-24.
163. Comm'n on Human Rights, supra note 78,
164. DarfurReport, supra note 96, % 12-17.
165. Id. 6.
166. Id.
167. Id. T 16.
94-105. Many reports contain some information
168. See DRC Report, supra note 106,
on the methodology, but it is often not addressed in detail or as a separate issue, as it was in this
report.
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document outlining the methodology to be followed by the Mapping
Team was drafted .. .,,169 This document discussed, among other things,
the following elements of methodology: "a gravity threshold for the
selection of serious violations, standard of evidence required, identity of
perpetrators and groups, confidentiality, witness protection, witness
interviewing guidelines with a standardised [format], and physical
evidence guidelines (including mass graves), among others." 7 0
The mission also assessed the reliability of information by applying
the "admiralty scale," which includes both an assessment of the
reliability and credibility of the sources, and a check on the validity of
the information obtained.' 7 ' This largely involved finding corroboration
for the evidence and comparing the data to other available information
from a different source. 2 However, "different reports on the same
incident and based on the same primary source would not constitute
corroboration by a separate source."' 7 3 While the DRC Report was more
helpful due to its defined methodology, it unfortunately remains an
exception to the rule.
D. Conclusion
A standard set of procedures and a modus operandi for fact-finding
missions do not exist. The rules, manuals and guidelines that have been
drafted are non-binding and are often not very explicit. Furthermore, it
seems that, in practice, mandate-holders pay little attention to these
rules. As the examples of the missions to Rwanda, Darfur, and the DRC
show, different missions apply different working methods, and interpret
the mandate and terms of reference as they see fit. Generally speaking,
the reports provide little information on the methodology applied. So,
even if certain common standards or practices existed, it would be
difficult to identify them, owing to the lack of information in the factfinding reports.
Some may argue that it is better to not have detailed standards
because every mission is different, and flexibility is required to address
the issues at stake in the mission at hand. However, a lack of cohesive
minimum standards can be detrimental to the efficiency, continuity, and
credibility of the missions. 174 As Bassiouni wrote:
[No manual exists to describe how an investigation should be
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. 97.
Id.
Id. 102.
Id.
Id.
See generally Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 40-42.
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conducted and there is no standard, though adaptable, computer
program to input collected data. Worst of all, there is no
continuity. In short, there is nothing to guide, instruct, or assist
the heads and appointees to these missions of how to better carry
out their mandates. It strains one's belief that in fifty years the
most elementary aspects of standardized organization, planning,
documentation, and reporting have not been developed. Thus,
each mission has to reinvent the wheel and, in an organizational
sense, has to reinvent itself as a mission.' 7 5
Even today the storage of data through modem-day computer
programs still seems to be an issue. Sunga, who himself like Bassiouni
has played a role in fact-finding missions, recently recommended that
human rights fact-finders "employ up-to-date technical means by which
to collect, organize and analyze information. .. ." 176 In addition to
questions of efficiency, the need for a modus operandi or standard
procedures should also be considered from a perspective of protecting
individuals' procedural rights, which will be further explored in the next
Parts.
III. COMPARING STANDARDS FOR ESTABLISHING INDIVIDUAL
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

A. Introduction
Establishing individual criminal responsibility is typically done in
criminal proceedings before a court, where the proceedings help ensure
the rights of due process and a fair trial. The violations of human rights
and humanitarian law investigated through U.N. fact-finding might
constitute international crimes and even jus cogens crimes, such as
and war crimes.,73
genocide, 7 7 certain crimes against humanity'
175. Id. at 40-41.
176. Sunga, supra note 26, at 201.
177. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 6 (defining genocide to include five
acts committed with the intent to destroy); ICTY, Updated Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 4 (2009), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/
Statutelstatute sept09 en.pdf [hereinafter ICTY Statute] (identifying the same five acts to
constitute genocide as the Rome Statute, but also stipulating five specific acts that were
punishable); ICTR, Basic Documents: Statute, art. 2 (2010), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/
English/Legal/Statute/2010.pdf [hereinafter ICTR Statute] (following the ICTY's two-part
definition).
178. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1) (recognizing eleven acts that
constitute "crime[s] against humanity" when committed with knowledge against a civilian
population); ICTY Statute, supra note 177, art. 5 (identifying nine acts); ICTR Statute, supra
note 177, art. 3 (same). Some crimes, such as rape, enforced disappearance and apartheid, have
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These crimes are considered the most heinous crimes for which the
perpetrators must not go unpunished.' 80 This notion has led the
international community to develop ad hoc and permanent international
tribunals to prosecute suspects of such crimes.IF' These institutions are
complementary to national proceedings and come into play when the
domestic criminal system is unwilling or unable to prosecute.' 82
The international procedural law that deals with questions of
evidence and proof is developed at the international level; accordingly,
international criminal tribunals are not bound by national rules of
procedure.1 83 The treaties creating the tribunals, contain very few
provisions regarding the procedural standards that should apply before
the corresponding international criminal court;84 as a result, the
responsibility of implementing more detailed rules has always been left
to the judges. 8 5
The ICTY and ICTR judges drafted and adopted rules of procedure
and evidence before the start of the trials which were laid down in
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE).'1s For the ICC, a Preparatory
Commission of Judges worked for two years on drafting rules of
procedure and evidence that were adopted in 2000 as the RPE of the
ICC.187 The different tribunals have further developed these rules
been deemed crimes against humanity, but there is no consensus as to whether these crimes also
constitutejus cogens crimes. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 70, at 14-16.
179. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 8 (defining war crimes extensively to
include numerous breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other violations of laws and
customs of international armed conflict); ICTY Statute, supranote 177, art. 3 (providing a nonextensive list of violations eligible for prosecution as war crimes).
180. For more onjus cogens crimes, see generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra
note 70, at 11-17. Bassiouni stipulates that, for these crimes, "there is a duty to prosecute and
punish[.]" INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 70, at 5.

181. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 70, at 29; Rome Statute, supra note
15, pmbl.
182.

Rome Statute, supra note 15, pmbl.; ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

LAw 399 (2d ed. 2008).
183. GEERT-JAN
KNooPs,
THEORY
AND
PRACTICE
INTERNATIONAL
AND
INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 183 (2005). For example, the ICTY RPE states
that the Chamber shall apply the rules it establishes in its rules of evidence section, and "shall
not be bound by national rules of evidence." ICTY R. P. & EVID. 89(A) (1994) (amended 2000).
184. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 583

(2003) (finding that because international investigating commissions and international criminal
tribunals "have been shaped by political leaders more than by jurists" there has been "little
attention [paid] to rules of procedure and evidence applicable in these institutions.").
185. ICTY Statute, supra note 177, art. 15; ICTR Statute, supra note 177, art. 14;
RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 22 (2002).

186. See ICTY R. P. & EVID., available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/
Rulesjprocedureevidence/it032rev46e.pdf; ICTR R. P. & EVID., available at http://unictr.org/
Portals/0/EnglishlLegal/ROP/1 00209.pdf.
187. BASSIOUNI, supra note 184, at 587-88.
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through their case law. General principles on the rules of evidence in
international criminal proceedings can thus be derived from the Treaties
of the Tribunals, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and the ICT

jurisprudence.18 8
In the following Part, I compare the procedural rules and practices
regarding the establishment of criminal responsibility in both factfinding missions and international criminal trials. I recognize that some
ICT standards are criticized as too minimal to provide a sufficient
guarantee that the rights of the parties involved are respected.18 9
However, I only address such criticism where it serves the comparison
between ICT and fact-finding procedures-for example, where there is
the possibility of closer coordinated collaboration between the two.
B. Standards ofProof
Similar to domestic criminal law proceedings, each stage of an
international criminal law procedure warrants a different level of proof.
For example, the level of proof required for an indictment is different
from the level of proof that must be met for a conviction. Relevant to
the standard of proof, the proceedings before the ICTY and the ICTR
can be divided into the investigation stage, the indictment stage, and the
trial stage.
The prosecutors of both the ICTY and the ICTR are competent to
start an investigation ex officio or following information obtained from
governments or U.N. organs. In the latter situation, the prosecutor
decides whether the information provides "sufficient basis to
proceed." 190 When the prosecutor, on the basis of this research,
concludes that there is a prima facie case, he or she submits an
indictment for approval to the judge.19 1
In order to confirm an indictment, the judge must be satisfied that
188. For the following analysis, this Article will only use the rules of evidence and
procedure as developed by the most recent international criminal tribunals, being the ICTY,
ICTR, and ICC. Other international tribunals include the International Military Tribunal sitting
in Nuremberg (IMT), which dealt with the atrocities committed by the Nazis during the Second
World War, and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), which prosecuted
international crimes committed by the Japanese during the Second World War. See generally
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 70, at 32-37. Next to the international tribunals,

several "mixed" or "special" courts have been created in the last two decades. Id. at 38-39.
These courts, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Cambodia Tribunal, are not
entirely national or international, but carry elements of both. Id
189.

See generallyMAY & WIERDA, supra note 185, at xiii-xviii.

190. ICTY Statute, supra note 177, art. 18(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 177, art. 17(1); see
also CASSESE, supra note 182, at 395.
191. ICTY Statute, supra note 177, art. 18(4); ICTR Statute, supra note 177, art. 17(4); see
also CASSESE, supra note 182, at 404.
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the prosecutor has established a prima facie case. 192 Geert-Jan Knoops
explains that according to case law, prima facie "means that the
prosecutor must provide sufficient evidence which, if it were accepted,
would be sufficient for the conviction of the accused in that the tribunal
could be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused."1 93 When the judge confirms the indictment, the suspect
becomes the accused. For a conviction of the accused, his or her guilt
must be proven "beyond reasonable doubt."' 94
With the adoption of the Rome Statute, however, some adjustments
have been made in the investigation and indictment stages. Under the
Rome Statute, the prosecutor may start an investigation proprio motu,
when a state party has requested so, or when the U.N. Security Council
has referred a case to the ICC.195 In the case of an investigation propio
motu, the prosecutor first starts with preliminary research that must
establish "a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation."' 96
Subsequently, the prosecutor must file a "request for authorization of an
investigation" to the Pre-Trial Chamber, after whose approval the
prosecutor can start with the actual investigation.' 9 7
This process of obtaining permission from the Pre-Trial Chamber
does not apply when a state party or the Security Council has referred
the case to the ICC.19 8 Rather, it is assumed that for a state or the
Security Council to request that the prosecutor commence an
investigation, a reasonable basis for further investigation has already
been established by the inquiry conducted at the national or U.N. level
that led to the referral.199
After the start of the investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber can issue
an arrest warrant (following an application by the prosecutor), when
there are "reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court" 200 and when the arrest of the
person is critical to the case. 201 After the investigation, the prosecutor
192.

ICTY Statute, supra note 177, art. 19, para. 1; ICTR Statute, supra note 177, art. 18,

para. 1; GEERT-JAN KNooPs, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

TRIBUNALS:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

128 (2003)

[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

TRIBUNALS].

193.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 192, at 128.

194. ICTY R. P. & Evid. 87(A); ICTR R. P. & Evid. 87(3).
195. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 15. Compare id.art. 13.
196. Id. art. 15, para. 3. See also CASSESE, supra note 182, at 399.
197. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 15, para. 4. See also CASSESE, supra note 182, at
396, 399 (discussing the distinguishing features of the ICC system).
198. CASSESE, supra note 182, at 396.
199. Id. at 396-97. Cassese specifically mentions the case of Darfir, in which the referral
decision was based on the report of the Commission of Inquiry, discussed above. Id.
200. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 58(1)(a).
201. See id. art. 58(1)(b) (listing three situations where arrest of the person is deemed
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submits the charges before a judge.20 2 A public hearing will be held to
confirm that there is "sufficient evidence to establish substantial
grounds to believe that the person committed the crime charged" and
that therefore the case can be assigned to a Trial Chamber for trial.2 03
Finally, like with the ICTY and the ICTR, the standard required for a
conviction by the ICC is proving guilt "beyond reasonable doubt." 204 I
reaching the conclusion of conviction, the accused will receive the
benefit of the doubt. 20 5
There are no written rules or guidelines on the standard of proof to
be applied in fact-finding missions. The Rwanda reports make no
mention of any standard of proof that was applied.20 6 In contrast, both
the missions to Darfur and to the DRC at the start of their mandates,
established a standard of proof that was to be applied by the missions. 2 07
In order to establish individual responsibility, the Darfur
Commission reasoned that it would "obviously not make final
judgements [sic] as to criminal guilt; rather it would make an
assessment of possible suspects . . ."20 Therefore, the Commission
would also not apply the standards employed by criminal tribunals, such
as those described above. Instead, the Commission chose to adopt the
following standard for criminal liability: "a reliable body of material
consistent with other verified circumstances, which tends to show that a
person may reasonably be suspected of being involved in the
commission of a crime.
The standard applied by the Mapping Exercise to the DRC was very
similar, but, while the Darfur mission focused on the individual
perpetrator, the Mapping Exercise aimed to identify events.
Acknowledging that the level of evidence required was lesser than that
required by a criminal court, the Mapping Exercise held that a
reasonable suspicion that the incident had occurred was most
appropriate.210 The Mapping Team subsequently defined reasonable
suspicion as "a reliable body of material consistent with other verified

necessary).
202. Id. art. 61(1).
203. Id. art. 61(5) (here the phrase is used to describe the type of evidence the prosecutor
needs to support the charge); id. art. 61(7) (here the phrase is used as the standard from which
the Pre-Trial Chamber is to move forward with the charges).
204. Id.art. 66(3); ICTY R. P. & EvID. 87(A); ICTR R. P. & EvID. 87.
205. CASSESE, supra note 182, at 418.
206. Comm'n on Human Rights, supra note 78; Letterfrom the Secretary-General,supra
note 89.
207. DarfurReport, supra note 96, 15; DRC Report, supra note 106, 101.
208. DarfurReport, supra note 96, 15.
209. Id.
210. DRCReport,supra note 106, 10 1.
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circumstances tending to show that an incident or event did happen."211
Despite the intention to avoid identifying individual suspects, the
mission did draw up a confidential list of alleged perpetrators. 12
To summarize, one can make a distinction between four different
standards of proof in international criminal investigations: the standard
required to start an investigation (a "reasonable basis" or a referral from
a state party or the Security Council); 2 13 the standard required for an
arrest warrant ("reasonable grounds that the person has committed a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court"); 2 14 the standard required for
an indictment ("substantial 2rounds to believe that the person
committed the crime charged"2 or, for the ICTY and ICTR, a "prima
facie" case);216 and the standard required for a conviction ("beyond
reasonable doubt"). 2 17 The fact-finding missions analyzed in this Article
neglected to mention the standard applied, or they applied standards
unlike any of the criminal standards mentioned above.
C. Admissibility ofEvidence
Article 89 of the ICTY and ICTR RPE states: "[a] Chamber maxy
admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value."2
In similar fashion, Article 69(4) of the Rome Statute provides:
The Court may rule on the relevance or admissibility of any
evidence, taking into account, inter alia, the probative value of
the evidence and any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a
fair trial or to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness, in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.2 19
Article 63(2) of the ICC RPE adds that "a Chamber shall have the
authority . . . to assess freely all evidence submitted in order to

determine its relevance or admissibility in accordance with article
69.,,220 According to Richard May and Marieke Wierda, relevant
evidence is evidence which helps to prove or disprove an element of the
case.221 It is up to the judges to "weigh the evidence in light of all the
211. Id.
212. Id. 103-04.
213. E.g., Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 15(3).
214. E.g., id. art. 58(1).
215. E.g., id. art. 61(7).
216. E.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 177, art. 19(1).
217. E.g., ICTY R. P. & EVID. 87(A).
218. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 89(C); ICTR R. P. & EVID. 89(C).
219. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 69(4).
220. ICC R. P. & EvID. 63(2).
221. See MAY & WIERDA, supra note 185, at 102.
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circumstances of the case and its context." 222
In line with this flexible procedure, certain kinds of evidence that in
some national criminal systems would be inadmissible are not
considered inadmissible in international criminal proceedings. For
example, none of the ICC RPE addresses the issue of hearsay
evidence.223 However, hearsay evidence has been accepted by both the
ICTY224 and the ICTR.225 In the cases of Prosecutor v. Blaskic and
Prosecutor v. Musema, both the ICTY and the ICTR emphasized that
judges will hear all the evidence, and only after the trial will they make
an assessment of the evidence presented, its relevance, its probative
value, and its reliability. 226
Rule 63 of the ICC RPE provides that these rules of evidence "shall
apply in proceedings before all Chambers." 227 This implies that the
rules of evidence apply in Pre-Trial Chamber proceedings, and thus will
operate when the prosecutor has filed a request for authorization of
investigation. Following that line of reasoning, these rules of evidential
admissibility would not apply to any of the investigatory stages
discussed earlier.
Antonio Cassese further explains that any information that is used by
a party can "only become evidence if admitted in court after being the
subject of arguments by the parties." 228 Thus, to be accepted as
evidence, the parties must first have had the opportunity to discuss the
information in court, and subsequently the court must have explicitly
admitted that piece of information as evidence to the trial. 229 Finally,
Article 64(2) of the ICC RPE holds that "[a] Chamber shall give reasons
for any rulings it makes on evidentiary matters." 230
As described in Part II, there are no binding rules on the
admissibility of evidence in U.N. fact-finding exercises. Rather, all
222. KNOOPS, supra note 183, at 184.
223. Id. at 137.
224. Cases involving the use of hearsay evidence include Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.
IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on Hearsay, 14 (Aug. 5, 1996); Prosecutor v.
Blaiki, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision on Standing Objection of the Defence to the Admission
of Hearsay with Inquiry as to its Reliability (Jan. 26, 1998); and Prosecutor v. Aleksovski,
Appeals Chamber Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, 15-19 (Feb.
16, 1999). See KNooPs, supra note 183, at 188-90.
225. For examples of hearsay evidence in the ICTR, see Prosecutor v. Akayesu Case No.
ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,

1

136 (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-

A, Judgment and Sentence, 51 (Jan. 27, 2000).
226. See Prosecutor v. Blagkik, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, T 34-36 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13A, Judgment and Sentence, $ 51 (Jan. 27, 2000).
227. ICC R. P. & Evid. 63(1) (emphasis added).
228. CASSESE, supra note 182, at 414.
229. Id.
230.

ICC R. P. & EvID. 64(2).
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evidence is admissible. According to Richard Lillich and Hurts
Hannum, "treaties may impose limitations on the kind of evidence that
may be considered, for example, by prohibiting the use of information
submitted anonymously, but otherwise international bodies enjoy an
unfettered right to consider any evidence they consider relevant." 2 Of
the different rules and guidelines that aimed to standardize the
procedure of human rights fact-finding, only the Draft Model Rules
contained a provision on the admissibility of evidence. 232 Rule 20
declares that all evidence is admissible, but that it is up to the
commission to decide whether it will actually use this evidence.2 3 3
Generally speaking, the mission reports do not include a description of
the evidentiary decisions taken.
In conclusion, while in human rights fact-finding all evidence is
admissible, in international criminal proceedings, evidence is admissible
only when it is relevant and has probative value. The question of the
admissibility of evidence is especially relevant for the trial stage and
other proceedings before any of the chambers. Preliminary
investigations, therefore, seem free from the bounds of evidentiary
rules.
D. Witnesses
The evidence that is produced before the contemporary international
234
courts is to a large extent based on witness testimony.23 Witness
testimony should in principle be given in person at trial, but when it
does not infringe with the rights of the accused, testimonies may also be
given or previously recorded through audio, video, or written statement
in accordance with the RPE.23 5 Under any circumstance, witnesses must
231.

RICHARD B. LILLICH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW,

POLICY, AND PRACTICE 475 (4th ed. 2006) (contributing this lack of evidentiary rules to the fact

that the purpose of fact-finding is not to use the evidence in court per se). Often the purpose is to
"disseminate the findings as widely as possible, with a view to rousing public opinion." Id.
232. As follows from a comparison of the different guidelines discussed in this Article.
See Rule 20 of the Draft Model Rules, supranote 131 and accompanying text.
233. Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 32.
234. NANCY ARMOURY COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 12 (2010). The IMT in

Nuremberg was largely based on documents because the Nazis had recorded every action and
decision meticulously. Id. at 6, 11-12. However, this is not the case in most current day
situations of mass atrocity, where hardly anything is recorded. Id.
235. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 69, para. 2; ICC R. P. & EVID. 67 (providing for the
possibility to have live testimony through audio or video technology under certain conditions);
ICC R. P. & EVID. 68 (allowing for previously recorded testimony under certain conditions). The
RPE of the ICTY are less explicit and merely state that "[a] Chamber may receive the evidence
of a witness orally or, where the interests of justice allows, in written form[.]" ICTY R. P. &
EVID. 89. However, according to the RPE of the ICTR, "[w]itnesses shall, in principle, be heard
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make a solemn declaration before they testify.23 6 In addition, it is
Lastly, the rule unus testis,
punishable to give a false statement.
nullus testis (one witness is no witness) does not apply in international
criminal proceedings; the testimony of a single witness is sufficient, and
it does not need to be corroborated by other evidence. 238
According to Knoops, the notion exists that "witness testimony will
contribute to fact finding and truth." 239 An important aspect of witness
testimony is therefore the credibility and reliability of the witness. The
ICTs are quite lenient when it comes to accepting that a witness is
credible. For example, when a court finds inconsistencies in the
testimony, that testimony can still be taken into account.240 This is
partly due to the fact that the witness testimony will be assessed in light
of all the evidence of the case. As a result, the court can decide that it
will use only certain portions of the testimony. 24 1
In the case of Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, the ICTR analyzed the
credibility of the witnesses. 242 It explained that a lack of detail in the
testimony would raise doubts. 24 However, the court accepted
corroborative evidence to support that testimony, to the extent that even
"two sketchy accounts" could corroborate each other. 244 In addition, the
ICTR accepted language difficulties, possible trauma, flaws in
interpretation, and translation as sufficient explanations for
discrepancies.245 In other cases, the ICTR has also taken into account
the culture of a witness to justify discrepancies.2 4 6
On the basis of her research, for which she analyzed numerous
transcripts of testimonies given before ICTs, Nancy Combs argues that
"much eyewitness testimony at the international tribunals is of highly

directly by the Chambers, unless a Chamber has ordered that the witness be heard by means of a
deposition as provided for in Rule 71 [.1" ICTY R.P. & EVID. 90(A). Rule 71(A) explains that
such a deposition will only be ordered under "exceptional circumstances[.]" Id.
236. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 90(a); ICC R.P. & EVID. 66. See also MAY & WIERDA, supra note
185, at 165.
237. See, e.g., ICTY R.P. & EVID. 91. See also MAY & WIERDA, supra note 185, at 174.
238. See ICC R.P. & EVID. 63(4); see also KNoops, supra note 183, at 196; MAY &
WIERDA, supra note 185, at 120.
239. KNooPs, supra note 183, at 186.
240. MAY & WIERDA, supra note 185, at 167.
241. Id.
242. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-lA, Judgment (June 7, 2001),
availableat http://www.unher.org/refworld/ docid/48abd5l70.html (last visited June 30, 2012).
243. Id. 532.
244. Id. 656.
245. Id. 411. See MAY & WIERDA, supra note 185, at 167-68.
246. MAY & WIERDA, supra note 185, at 168. In the case of Prosecutor v. Bagilishema,
trauma was accepted as an explanation for discrepancies. Bagilishema,Case No. ICTR-95-IA,
411.
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questionable reliability." 24 7 For example, some of the problems relate to
differences in understanding measurements and distance, or different
Such misunderstandings or imprecise
ideas of time and dates.
testimony could be overcome through the use of in situ investigations,
in which the missing or unclear information could be clarified by
verifying the description of the scene as testified to. 249
However, thus far, such on-site investigations have not commonly
been carried out as part of international criminal proceedings.2 5 0 For
fact-finding missions, in contrast, the actual investigation in a country
or region, provided that the mandate-holders are allowed access to the
territory, is probably the most important element of the exercise. 2 51
Even so, it should be noted that some of the discrepancies in
Bagilishema came to light only after the witness had been crossexamined,252 a mechanism that is not typically used in fact-finding
missions.
The use of anonymous witnesses in the criminal tribunals is quite
extensive. To testify anonymously, the witness need only show a
genuine fear that he or his family would be put at risk by his testifying
in court.253 Such anonymous testimony is permitted during the pre-trial
stage. However, during the trial stage, it is believed that the rights of the
suspect prevail, and that the witnesses cannot retain their anonymity
without specific reason.25 4 In contrast to anonymous testimony, little use
is made of expert witnesses.25255 The most important rules for expert
witnesses are that he must be independent, have the necessary
qualifications, and use the right methods. 56
Regarding the use and treatment of witnesses by U.N. fact-finding
missions, very few general rules can be identified. The Draft Model
Rules allow states to question witnesses, and hold that the witnesses
257
The Training Manual on
must take an oath before they testify.
Human Rights Monitoring contains a chapter providing guidance (i.e.,
no binding standards) to fact-finders on how to prepare for, conduct,
and evaluate a witness interview, including the need for verification of
247.

COMBS, supra note 234, at 4.

248. Id. at 24-33.
249. Id. at 281.
250. COMBS, supra note 234, at 281-82.
251. See supra Part L.A (discussing how human rights fact-finding can take place within
the domestic sphere of a country. In order to do so, the mandate-holder must receive the
permission of the government to enter and investigate in the country.).
252. See Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A, 749.
253. MAY & WIERDA, supra note 185, at 180.
254. Id.
255.

COMBS, supra note 234, at 12.

256.

Id. at 199.

257.

LILLICH & HANNUM, supra note 132, at 475.
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the information obtained through it.258 The Training Manual also deals
with the possible need for the protection of witnesses, but not
specifically with the use and evaluation of anonymous or expert
testimony. 9 The Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of
the Human Rights Council generally states that information should be
crosschecked "to the best extent possible." 260 However, none of the
other rules, guidelines, or manuals addresses the treatment of witnesses
and use of witness testimony explicitly.
In practice, maintaining the anonymity of witnesses seems to be the
rule rather than exception. In fact-finding reports, the identity of
witnesses is usually not revealed. The mission will keep records of the
information and the witnesses, but that information is usually not open
to the public. In the case of the DRC, the mission submitted a database
with all relevant information to the OHCHR in Geneva, 26 1 which
included information on over 1000 witnesses.2 6 2 In order to verify or
invalidate information, the interviewers of the Mapping Exercise had to
make sure that "each reported incident [was] corroborated by at least
one independent source in addition to the primary source in order to
confirm its authenticity." 263 In addition, the Mapping Team tested the
credibility and reliability of sources and witnesses with the assistance of
the admiralty scale mentioned in Part II.C. 264
In contrast, both Rwandan reports give very little information in this
respect. The Special Rapporteur merely states that he met with officials;
representatives of U.N. agencies, the International Committee of the
Red Cross and other international NGOs; and individual witnesses of
different nationalities, including Rwandans. 2 65 The Special Rapporteur
does not provide any information on the evaluation of the information
obtained, the identity of the individual witnesses, the manner in which
the information was recorded, or the standards for evaluating the
credibility of witnesses. The Commission of Experts describes in like
manner how it gathered information; it merely lists the type of
information that was collected (mainly consisting of reports), and does
not give any details on how this information was treated, assessed or
evaluated. 2 6
258. Training Manual, supra note 161, ch. VII.
259. Id.atlO-11.
260. Special Procedures Mandate-Holders, Manual of Operations of the Special
Procedures of the Human Rights Council, 23 (2008), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
chr/special/annualmeetings/docs/ManualSpecialProceduresDraft0608.pdf.
261. DRC Report, supranote 106, 119.
262. Id. T 118.
263. Id. 117.
264. Id. 120.
265. Comm'n on Human Rights, supra note 78, In 14-17.
19-40.
266. Letterfrom the Secretary-General,supra note 89,
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The mission to Darfur adopted an approach that lies somewhere in
the middle of the previous two cases. It describes in more detail the
activities it undertook, the kind of material selected, the places visited,
the number of witnesses interviewed, and the location of its
interviews. 267 However, it does not go into detail on the identity of
witnesses, the evaluation of their credibility and reliability, or the
corroboration of their testimonies.
The rule that witnesses must make a declaration or oath is thus
present in both international criminal procedural law and fact-finding
rules. It is, however, not clear whether in practice mandate-holders
ensure that witnesses make a declaration before they testify. In contrast
to international criminal proceedings, there are no rules that permit
witnesses to be punished for giving a false statement in the context of a
fact-finding mission. 2 68 In addition, while the use of anonymous
witnesses in fact-finding seems to be rule rather than exception, only the
ICTs' trial stage permits a witness to remain anonymous if he provides
specific reasons why he wishes to stay anonymous. 69 Finally, the use of
cross-examination as a means to strengthen the rights of the accused is
not a common tool in fact-finding missions.
On the other hand, ICTs are quite generous with admitting vague and
inconsistent witness testimony. In that respect, the DRC mission seemed
to employ even higher standards than those in the ICTs by making sure
that every reported incident was corroborated by another source, and by
applying the admiralty scale in assessing the credibility and reliability
of evidence (including witness testimony).2 70
Even though not all fact-finding reports set the standards at the DRC
mission's level, the missions do conduct at least part of the investigation
in the territory in question, which allows the missions-members to
267. Darfur Report, supra note 96, IN 12-17, 20-25. See also id. TT 19-124 (listing the
meetings with Sudanese government officials, the places the Commission visited, and the public
reports that the Commission consulted).
268. As follows from the different guidelines referred to in this Article, particularly the
tone of the Training Manual which stresses that witness testimony is voluntary and often at the
initiative of the witness. Training Manual, supra note 161, ch. VIII, at 110. It also stipulates that
the fact-finder should ensure to create an ambiance of "acceptance and trust" during the
interview. Id. at 116. See generally id ch. VIII.
269. MAY & WIERDA, supra note 185, at 180.
270. This is apparent from the mandates and Terms of Reference of the different missions,
in which the phrasing might vary, but in which elements of information gathering, reporting,
and providing conclusions and recommendations are usually included. See, e.g., DarfurReport,
supra note 96, 1 2, including the duty "to investigate reports of violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties; to determine also whether or not
acts of genocide ha[d] occurred; and to identify the perpetrators," while the Special Rapporteur
to Rwanda was assigned such tasks as investigation, reporting, providing information, and
"identify[ing] priorities in terms of investigations." Comm'n on Human Rights, supra note 78,
M8-10.
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verify and cross-check at the scene. On-site investigations are not as
27
frequently conducted as part of international criminal proceedings. 1
E. The Role of the Fact-FinderVersus the Role of the
Prosecutorand Judge
The role of the fact-finder is very different from that of the
prosecutor and the judges of an ICT. In human rights fact-finding, it is
usually the mandate-holder's task to gather the evidence, evaluate the
evidence, present the evidence in a report, draw (legal) conclusions, and
provide recommendations for further action. 272 In international criminal
proceedings, by contrast, the prosecutor collects and presents the
evidence, while the judges evaluate it and draw legal conclusions.
The mandate-holder does not have the same investigative powers as
the prosecutor. Both the prosecutor and the fact-finder depend largely
on the cooperation of states to successfully carry out their
investigations. However, the prosecutor has been given stronger powers
to summon witnesses and to arrest suspects (although these powers are
subject to review of the Chambers).2 7 3 The prosecutor can also
undertake any measure that is necessary to complete the
investigation.
Finally, the prosecutor is obliged to release all exculpatory evidence
"as soon as practicable." 275 The mandate of most missions to find the
facts and collect information could imply that mandate-holders include
both incriminating and exculpatory evidence in their reports and use
both before drawing conclusions. However, no such requirements can
be identified in the various rules and guidelines. In practice, most
reports go no further than to include a description of what the mandateholder has concluded the facts to be, based on the underlying
evidence.2 7 6
F. Rights of the Suspect
When a person becomes a suspect in a criminal investigation, he
obtains certain rights. The Rome Statute explicitly sets out these rights
in Article 55.277 Section 1 of this Article applies to any investigation and
any person subject to investigation, which includes a suspect or a
271.
272.
273.

See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
As follows from the report read in preparation of the research for this Article.
See, e.g., ICTY R.P. & EVID. 39(i), 40(i).

274. E.g., ICTY R.P. & EvID. 39(ii).
275. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 68(i). See also MAY & WIERDA, supra note 185, at 33, 76
(discussing the prosecution's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence).
276. As follows from the reports read in preparation of the research for this Article.
277. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 55.
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witness. 278 This section holds that
a person: [s]hall not be compelled to incriminate himself or
herself or to confess guilt; [s]hall not be subjected to . . . torture .
. . or . . . [mistreatment] . .. ; shall .. . have, free of any cost, the
assistance of a competent interpreter ... ; [and] shall not be

subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. 2 79
The second section of Article 55 adds rights for persons who are
suspected of committing a crime within the ICC's jurisdiction, and who
are about to be questioned. These rights include the right to be informed
(prior to questioning) that there are grounds to believe the person has
committed such a crime, the right to free access to legal counsel, and the
right to remain silent.2 80
In the context of U.N. fact-finding, the alleged perpetrator usually
only learns that he is a suspect once the report is published or once the
findings of the report are communicated to the government.2 1 The
rules, guidelines, and manuals on the conduct of fact-finding do not in
any way address this issue. From the fact-finding reports here discussed
(but also generally), it is difficult to discern how mandate-holders
approach the issue of guaranteeing the rights of suspects (or other
actors). One can imagine that an alleged perpetrator, who might already
be a suspect in the eyes of the mandate-holder, may unknowingly
provide self-incriminating information. However, the reports I studied
did not indicate that such incrimination actually occurred.
G. Conclusion
On some very important matters, significant discrepancies are
observable between the rules and practices of fact-finding methods and
international criminal procedures. These matters relate to the standard
of proof, the absence of cross-examination in fact-finding, the reasoning
for evidentiary decisions and evaluation of evidence, the role of the
actors (fact-finders versus prosecutors and judges), and the rights of
suspects. Bearing in mind the non-judicial nature of U.N. fact-finding
missions, I conclude that the norms and practices of these missions do
not meet the standards of international criminal law. 282
278.

CASSESE, supra note 182, at 403

279. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 55(1).
280. Id. See also CASSESE, supra note 182, at 403-04 (explaining that, in addition to being
"laid down" in Article 55, these rights are recognized as part of international customary and
treaty law).
281. See generally Alston, supra note 56, at 573.
282. See supra note 150-51 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, certain weaknesses also exist in the international
criminal trials. For example, the heavy reliance on witness testimony
and the relatively lenient way in which discrepant, vague and even
sketchy testimonies are accepted as evidence. These weaknesses justify
the question whether information gathered in fact-finding missions can
add value as corroborative evidence.
IV. ANALYZING THE SCOPE OF FACT-FINDING: ESTABLISHING
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY?

A. Introduction
In the introduction to this Article, I highlighted three views on the
interplay between human rights fact-finding and individual criminal
prosecution. Bassiouni believes that establishing accountability of the
perpetrators is one of the goals of fact-finding, even if it has not yet
been accepted as such.28 3 Knoops argues that legal conclusions on
criminal responsibility in fact-finding reports could lead to a
polarization of the parties involved.2 8 4 Sunga asserts that there should be
closer coordination between the United Nations and the ICC, when it
comes to information gathering.2 8 5 According to Sunga, fact-finding
reports could be used for general background information in criminal
prosecutions, but also "in some instances, for identifying cases ripe for
prosecution."286 He maintains that "UN human rights fact-finding
mechanisms should focus more on the eventuality of international or
domestic criminal prosecutions and adjust their working methods

accordingly." 28 7
In practice, the mandates of fact-finding missions have included a
wide range of criminal implications: from identifying the crimes
perpetrated, to identifying the perpetrators (whether they are states,
groups, or individuals), to gathering evidence with a view to criminal
prosecutions. Similarly, the international responses to such missions
vary from no response at all (as in the case of Guinea), to increasing
political and economic pressure (as in the Southern African case), to
establishing international criminal tribunals and referring cases to the
ICC. Neither the standard practices followed, nor the existing manuals,
rules, or guidelines on fact-finding sufficiently define what the desired
criminal implications of human rights fact-finding missions are.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See Bassiouni, supranote 18, at 45.
See KNooPS, supra note 22, at 94-95.
See Sunga, supra note 25, at 188.
Id.
Id.
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In this Part, I analyze both the scope of fact-finding within the
current legal framework, and its (possibly) desired scope. In doing so, I
address the content of the mandates, the working methods, the
responses to conclusions in fact-finding reports, and the positions of the
actors involved. Most importantly I raise legal and political (or
normative), as well as practical questions, that I believe should be taken
into account when discussing the scope of human rights fact-finding.
B. The Scope ofFact-FindingGiven the CurrentLegal Framework
Clearly, the scope of fact-finding missions does not and should not
have the same legal implications as a conviction in international
criminal proceedings. Due to its non-judicial character, 288 the
mechanism of fact-finding simply cannot meet some of the most
important elements and safeguards of a judicial process-those that aim
to guarantee the rights of suspects and other persons involved in the
investigation.
In addition, fact-finders are not judges,2 8 9 and sometimes not even
lawyers or legal experts in the field of international human rights,
humanitarian, or criminal law.290 Moreover, the fact-finding reports
cannot be compared to a judgment by a court, especially in the sense
that they do not contain a legal or factual reasoning, including on
evidentiary decisions.
It is less obvious whether fact-finding reports could serve as the
(sole) basis for indictments or arrest warrants, or have the same legal
implications. Key obstacles in that respect are the rights guaranteed to
the suspect during the indictment and arrest warrant proceduresparticularly, the rights as laid down in Article 55, section 2 of the Rome
Statute.291 For example, during a fact-finding mission, it might be more
challenging to guarantee that the suspect is informed of any allegations
and assisted by legal counsel. Also, there is little possibility to verify
that a person has been informed of the right to remain silent. Another
challenge is that the stages of indictment and arrest warrants are already
subject to judicial review, which is absent in fact-finding missions.
Even if the fact-finding missions can be restructured in such a way that
these procedural safeguards can be guaranteed, the question remains
whether this is the scope to which the international community should
wish to extend the ambit of fact-finding missions.
There are, however, no legal obstacles for fact-finding missions or
reports to serve as or form the basis for preliminary investigations-that
288.
289.
290.
291.

See H.R.C. Res 5/2, supra note 141, art. 8(c).
See KNOOPS, supra note 22, at 95.
See generally Alston, supra note 127, at 370.
Rome Statute art. 55 § 2.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol24/iss2/4

40

Talsma: U.N. Human Rights Fact-Finding: Establishing Individual Criminal
2012]

U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING: ESTABLISHING INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY?

423

is, for the preliminary research a prosecutor conducts-in order to
request authorization from a judge to proceed with the official
investigation, or as the basis for referral by a state or the Security
Council. The main difference in guarantees that apply in fact-finding
and international criminal proceedings at the preliminary investigation
stage is the applicability of Article 55(1) of the Rome Statute. Those
safeguards include the right not to incriminate oneself, the right to an
interpreter and to translation, and the right not to be arbitrarily arrested
or detained.2 9 2 It is highly unlikely that these rights cannot be or are not
guaranteed in a fact-finding mission. For example, fact-finders
generally already make use of an interpreter, simply because it would
render their work impossible if they could not speak to witnesses as a
result of language differences.
On another note, based on the above preliminary analysis of the use
of fact-finding documentation as evidence in international criminal
trials, it is difficult to imagine that such documentation could be used as
direct evidence. For example, any witnesses interviewed by the
mandate-holder would again need to be questioned and cross-examined
in court. Certain information could, however, be used to corroborate the
evidence in trial. Sunga explains, while referencing Bassiouni, that this
was also the case before the ICTY, where many of the documents that
were gathered by the Commission of Experts to the Former Yugoslavia
and handed to the Prosecutor of the ICTY "could not be used directly as
evidence in prosecutions but were useful more to help establish the
location, character and scale of violations." 293 The more general use of
fact-finding documentation could be especially beneficial in the case of
vague and inconsistent witness testimony as described in Nancy Combs'
research.2 9 4 Finally, fact-finding reports can form the basis for noncriminal responses, such as increasing political pressure and
implementing economic sanctions.
C. Improving the Standards to Meet the Needs Within the Current
Legal Framework
In short, in my opinion there are three situations in which it is legally
justified to use the results of a human rights fact-finding mission: for
preliminary investigations as part of an international criminal procedure,
to serve as corroborative evidence in an international criminal trial, and
as the basis for decisions on non-criminal responses. I argue that in each
292. Id. art. 55(1).
293. Sunga, supra note 26, at 193 (describing Commission Member M. Cherif Bassiouni's
opinion of the information it gleaned during its mission).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 247-49.
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of these situations, the working methods need to be improved and
standardized. Given the possibly far-reaching consequences of
responses to fact-finding reports, the information on which these
responses are based should be verifiable and obtained through methods
of comparable quality. For example, in order for the Security Council to
make a decision for referral, or for the prosecutor to request
authorization for the start of an investigation, they should have access to
information that is gathered using the same set of guarantees and
applying the same standards of evidentiary credibility and reliability.
Therefore, it is recommendable that the United Nations adopts new
procedural rules that include a number of minimum checks and
balances. First, fact-finding reports ought to contain a chapter on
methodology, containing at least some information on data collection,
the storage of data, the treatment of witnesses, the evaluation and
corroboration of evidence, and the standards of proof and credibility
applied. Second, the fact-finding reports should include a reasoning that
describes the evaluation of evidence and the evidentiary decisions
taken. Third, it would be beneficial to have standard (computer and data
collection) programs and formats to facilitate the process. Fourth, new
rules of procedure should give guidance on how to weigh credibility and
reliability, and to corroborate evidence. Finally, best would be for at
least one of the experts in a mission to have knowledge of and
experience in the field of international criminal law and international
humanitarian law.
D. Reconsideringthe Scope ofHuman Rights Fact-Finding
Even though the aforementioned criminal implications of human
rights fact-finding missions are legally justifiable, the question remains
whether the international community should permit fact-finding
missions to have (to a lesser or larger extent) criminal implications.
Bearing in mind the purpose of fact-finding-to maintain international
peace, to develop friendly relations, and to promote human rights--one
can imagine that fact-finding missions refrain altogether from drawing
conclusions with criminal implications. 295 As previously stated, Knoops
argues that conclusions on criminal responsibility could have a
polarizing effect. 2 96 In similar fashion, the Rwandan government has
argued that the DRC report would disrupt the peace efforts in the
region.297 Possibly, the Rwandan government would have been less
offended and less critical of the report had it merely stated events and
named the actors involved, without drawing the conclusions on
295. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
296. KNOOPS, supra note 22, at 95.
297. Government of Rwanda Report, supra note 116,
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responsibility (including the responsibility of the Rwandan government
for the crime of genocide on the Hutu). It is worth exploring whether
fact-finding reports would be of more or less value if they refrained
from offering conclusions on actual criminal responsibility and instead
recommended that criminal justice mechanisms examine the question of
culpability.
A further question is to what extent conclusions in fact-finding
reports imply an obligation for the international community to act. As
mentioned, despite similar conclusions that comparable crimes had been
committed, international responses varied by case-from inaction, to
the establishment of the ICTR, and to the referral of cases to the ICC
Prosecutor. Bassiouni opines that for such crimes as genocide, war
298
crimes, and crimes against humanity, there exists a duty to prosecute.
Arguably, in all cases in which a mission concludes that one or more of
these crimes have been committed an obligation of the international
community to make sure these crimes do not go unpunished emerges.
Surely, crimes against humanity committed in Darfur are no worse than
those committed in Guinea, even though the Security Council referred
cases to the ICC Prosecutor regarding the former but not the latter. On
the other hand, one can imagine that in certain situations where crimes
against humanity have been committed, it would be more opportune to,
for example, create mechanisms of truth and reconciliation, rather than
to strive for criminal prosecution. Either way, it could be argued that
conclusions by fact-finding missions that jus cogens crimes have been
committed should call to life an obligation for the international
community to actively respond through either one of the previous
options, or with the help of other imaginable justice mechanisms.
When reconsidering the scope of fact-finding missions, one must
take into account what the mandate ought to look like. In current
practice, mandates tend to be vaguely phrased to give the mandateholder enough flexibility to interpret that mandate according to the
situation. However, if conclusions on criminal responsibility are the
aim, one could argue that the mandate should be more specifically
phrased. Perhaps the mandate could make clear that it is a preliminary
investigation that may lead to possible future criminal proceedings,
which may encourage the mandate-holder to inform possible suspects of
the nature of the exercise, so as to prevent them from incriminating
themselves. Or, perhaps the mandate could specifically authorize the
mission to investigate only certain individuals. Whether the mandate
should specifically order the creation of a list of names of alleged
perpetrators and whether that list should remain anonymous are other
important questions.
298.
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A further critical consideration in this context is whether criminal
implications of human rights fact-finding should or could affect the
position of the mandate-holder. For example, it is questionable whether
human rights fact-finding with a view to establishing criminal
responsibility should be conducted by a single, non legally-trained
expert. Given the legal assessment that needs to be made, it seems
prudent that there be at least one lawyer in the commission who has
expertise in the field of international criminal law and international
humanitarian law. 2 99 Sunga suggests this should even be an expert with
prosecutorial experience..
Finally, it should be taken into consideration whether criminal
implications of human rights fact-finding will deter witnesses or put
them at higher risk than when human rights fact-finding merely has
political implications. Within the current system the protection of
witnesses is primarily taken into account through preventive measures,
rather than by means of actual protection. 3 0 1 If witnesses are put in
jeopardy, the United Nations will need a proactive response assuming
that the international community is willing to back its decision to
protect witnesses for these purposes.
V. CONCLUSION

Although U.N. human rights fact-finding missions have dealt with
the question of individual responsibility ever since their early use, in the
last two decades, the responses to conclusions on individual
responsibility have more and more taken that of a criminal procedural
nature. The interplay between human rights fact-finding and
international criminal investigations has evolved in different ways; for
example, some fact-finding missions were followed by the creation of
an international criminal tribunal (such as the ICTY and the ICTR).
And, since the establishment of the ICC, fact-finding missions have
formed the basis for referral by the Security Council to the ICC
Prosecutor, or formed the basis for the ICC Prosecutor to launch an
investigation.
This development has taken place purely in practice; no procedures
have been designed to standardize and customize human rights factfinding for this purpose. As a result, there are significant discrepancies
in the formulations of the mandates dealing with questions of individual
299. See Sunga, supra note 26, at 201.
300. Id.
301. Training Manual, supra note 161, at 111. The Training Manual even states: "In any
case, it should be made clear that the HRO [Human Rights Officer] cannot assure the safety of
the witness." Id.
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criminal responsibility. Also, the standards applied to prove such
responsibility vary greatly, and the methodology followed to gather and
evaluate the evidence is reinvented by each mission.
The differences in mandates, as well as in how missions are carried
out and how the international community has responded to the
conclusions drawn in the reports, justify questioning what the proper
scope of the fact-finding missions is and should be. Given the current
legal framework, the practice of fact-finding missions cannot entail
more than a preliminary investigation that may form the basis for a
referral or the start of an investigation in international criminal
proceedings. In addition, fact-finding reports can be used as indirect
(corroborative) evidence in criminal trials, and can lead to non-criminal
responses, such as imposing economic sanctions.
For these applications, the current working methods should be
revised in order for the U.N. organs to solidly base decisions of referral
or other responses on verifiable information, obtained with the use of
methods of comparable quality. The United Nations needs to adopt rules
for standardized procedures that address the working methods and the
methodology of fact-finding missions. In addition, standardized
computer programs need to be used to store and register data. Finally,
experts with knowledge of and experience in international criminal law
and international humanitarian law should be part of the mission.
However, the question remains whether this is also the scope that the
United Nations intends (or should intend) human rights fact-finding to
have. While reaching an answer to this question, it ought to be taken
into account to what extent conclusions on individual responsibility
contribute to the purpose of maintaining peace and promoting human
rights, or whether they might have a polarizing and counter-productive
effect. In addition, one must recognize that the possible consequences of
conclusions on individual responsibility might deter witnesses from
cooperating. Finally, it should be considered whether redefining the
scope of fact-finding will affect the phrasing of the mandate or the
position of the mandate-holder.
For credible continuity of the exercise of human rights fact-finding
with the possibility of subsequent international criminal prosecutions, it
is time that the United Nations reconsiders the practice of human rights
fact-finding and makes normative, political, and legal decisions
regarding its future use.
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